Interest Groups in a Multi-level Polity: The Impact of European Integration on National Systems by Gerda Falkner
RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Interest Groups in a Multi-level Polity:




EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTERSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner
All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the author.
© 1999 Gerda Falkner
Printed in Italy in December 1999
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
ItalyRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner
Abstract
Authors have forwarded seemingly contradictory hypotheses on how European
integration might impact on national interest  intermediation. This paper
advocates including the meso level in the analysis, i.e. looking systematically at
the policy- and sector-specific characteristics in European governance. From
that perspective, it seems that the impact of Euro-politics could be much more
diverse (in the sense of differentiated between policy areas) than hitherto
expected. In addition, we should pay attention to the existence (and limits) of
different types of impact potentials of Euro-level patterns on the national
systems.
Based on these analytical differentiations, I expect that the public–private
interaction styles in the European multi-layer system will – in the long run –
rather converge. The result might be a “more uniform  pluriformism” in the
multi-level system characterised by, on the one hand, the co-existence of
different ideal-types of policy networks (the paper distinguishes between statist
clusters, issue networks, policy communities and  corporatist policy
communities) at both the European and the national levels. On the other hand,
Europeanisation tends to decrease diversity between the various Member States
since basically all national policy networks are nowadays affected by the impact
of the specific corresponding EU policy and the relevant network there. Intra-
system diversity of forms of public–private interaction might thus be
increasingly accompanied by a trend of inter-system convergence due to
Europeanisation.RSC 99/34  © Gerda FalknerRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner
I.  Introduction*
Does the EU represent transnational pluralism that will trickle down through the
European  multi-level system? Or is it a “ statist pluralist” model which
nevertheless impinges badly on, first,  statist national polities and, second,
corporatist ones? Or does the EU herald a completely new form of governance,
i.e. a problem-solving style of co-operation between public and private actors
that will succeed hierarchy between public and private actors as well as
competition between interest groups, in both the supra-national and the national
spheres?
It seems that there are good arguments for all of these well-known
hypotheses that were put forward in recent scholarly writing on European
integration and interest intermediation. If so, there must be an analytical key to
open the doors between the seemingly contradictory scenarios. I hold that
including the meso level in the analysis, i.e. looking systematically at the policy-
and sector-specific characteristics in European governance, will do the trick. In
addition, we should pay attention to the existence of different types of impact
potentials of Euro-level patterns on the national systems. Based on this
analytical differentiation, I expect that the public–private interaction styles in the
European multi-layer system will – in the long run – rather converge. The result
might be a “moderate diversity” characterised by, on the one hand, the co-
existence of different ideal-types of policy networks ( statist clusters, issue
networks, policy communities and corporatist policy communities) at both the
European and the national levels. On the other hand,  Europeanisation has
decreased diversity between the various Member States and will continue to do
so, since basically all national policy networks are nowadays affected by the
impact of the specific corresponding EU policies and the relevant networks
there. Intra-system diversity of forms of public–private interaction might thus be
increasingly moderated by a trend of inter-system convergence due to
Europeanisation. Since the effect of Euro-politics is in most cases an indirect
and “soft” one, to be mediated by national institutions (in the wider sense; see
III.3.), no uniform systems of interest  intermediation will result even in the
longer run.
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Section II reviews the state of the relevant literature and its shortcomings,
thus outlining the background for the development of a new approach in section
III. The latter rests, first, on meso-level policy networks as the characteristic
settings of public–private interaction in policy-making and on four simple ideal-
types to characterise them at both the EU and the national level (sub-section
III.1). Second, this approach builds on the distinction of three different
mechanisms of potential EU impact on national interest  intermediation (sub-
section III.2). The conclusions then present some preliminary hypotheses on
relevant future developments.
Without doubt, the analysis of  Europeanisation and national interest
politics as outlined here on the basis of four policy network ideal-types and three
potential feedback mechanisms represents a research programme to be realised
in future comparative empirical studies rather than final results. However, a look
at the differing potential influences of Europeanisation on various national policy
networks (Table 2) and on the great variety of potential transmission effects of
public–private interaction patterns already suggests that a global approach
assuming only one EU ideal-type and deriving one similar impetus exerted via
just one mechanism for all national policy networks is unrealistic.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 5
II.  The State of the Debate on European Integration and National
Public–private Relations: Definitions, Classifications and Expectations
Vary
In the European Union, there are quite different models of public–private
interaction in the making of public policies. At least at first glance, they may be
distinguished neatly in three classic political science paradigms: statism refers to
a model where private interests have no significant role in public decision-
making. In  pluralist polities, there are many interest  groups which lobby
individually, i.e. they express their views in an effort to influence the politicians
who actually take the decisions. In corporatist systems, by contrast, a few
privileged interest groups (usually the peak associations of labour and industry)
are incorporated in public decision-making as decisive co-actors. A closer look
reveals that the definitions used in the literature of most notably corporatism, but
also pluralism, differ a lot.
1. Differing Definitions of “Corporatism” and “Pluralism”
A specific type of interest group system1 and a particular form of co-operative
policy-making2 have, in combination, been regarded as the hallmark of
corporatism at least by a mainstream (see e.g. Cawson, 1985a, 8) (this two-
dimensional definition of corporatism will inform the ideal-types presented later
in this text). But over time, corporatism was also “defined as an ideology, a
variant of political culture, a type of state, a form of economy, or even as a kind
of society” (Schmitter, 1996, 3).3 What is crucial here: even in most recent
                                              
1 “Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered
and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports”
(Schmitter, 1974, 13).
2  Lehmbruch opposed “ corporatist” co-operation of organisations and public authorities, and
“pluralist” pressure politics (see Lehmbruch, 1982, 8 with further references). Along these lines, a
corporatist policy-making process was also described as “a mode of policy formation in which
formally designated interest associations are incorporated within the process of authoritative
decision-making and implementation. As such they are officially recognised by the state not merely
as interest intermediaries but as co-responsible  partners in governance and social guidance”
(Schmitter, 1981, 295).
3 Until today, the comparative industrial relations literature thus tends to speak about “corporatism”
(without further specification) if in a state, labour markets and industrial relations are managed by
co-operative governance of industry, unions and (partly) the state (e.g. Traxler, 1995, 5), even if
other policy areas in the same political system may follow completely different patterns. In politicalRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 6
writing on European integration, e.g. in accounts of public–private patterns and
European integration, authors do not necessarily refer to the same animal when
talking about “corporatism”. Vivien Schmidt defines as corporatism a situation
where interests have privileged access to both decision-making and
implementation and as pluralism a situation where there is large set of interests
involved in decision-making but they have no impact in implementation since a
regulatory approach prevails there. Finally, she defines as  statism a situation
where societal interests are not involved in decision-making at all but that they
are accommodated during the policy implementation phase  (Schmidt, 1996;
1997).  Beate  Kohler-Koch, by contrast, developed another definition of
corporatism for the macro level of political systems. Her typology of “modes of
governance” is based on the two categories “organising principle of political
relations” (majority rule versus consociation) and “constitutive logic of a polity”
(politics as investment in common identity versus reconciliation of competing
self-interests). Corporatist governance in her view captures, first, the pursuit of a
common interest and, second, the search for consensus instead of majority
voting  (Kohler-Koch, 1999, 26). Andersen and  Eliassen, in turn, implicitly
defined as “a  corporatist structure” one in which bodies consisting of both
interest organisations and Community institutions are decisive (Andersen and
Eliassen, 1991, 17).
Such a nominal “mess” is not a novel problem in political science since
the older concept of pluralism as well presented to its critics a constantly moving
target (Grant, 1985a, 19).4 In contrast with the previously dominant élite model,
“pluralists” originally assumed widespread, effective, political resources; multiple
centres of power; and optimum policy development through competing interests.
What seems – at least nowadays – unclear is whether the groups can just make
themselves heard at some consultative stage of the decision-making process or if
they actually all have equal influence on the decision-makers. The fact that
pluralism is typically connected with a clear separation of state and society and
with the state being an arbiter of the competition between interest groups
                                                                                                                                                 
science, Scandinavian scholars take the same approach because in their countries, centralised
wage bargaining is empirically the major incident of corporatist patterns (Karlhofer and Sickinger,
1999, 245 with further references). Economists tend to speak about corporatism as a particular
style of economic policy and the conceptual incongruencies become even more obvious if we look
at the extreme diversity of specific indicators for, and detailed measurements of corporatism
(Keman and Pennings, 1995).
4 “Since pluralism is so vague a set of ideas it is difficult to understand how opponents can have
rejected it with such confidence” (Jordan, 1990, 286). German authors may use a very different
concept since “pluralism” has a less specific meaning in German since it was used to distinguish
liberal societies from monist ones before the international debate on corporatism started in 1974
(Lehmbruch, 1996, fn 4).RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 7
(Cawson, 1978, 182f)5 is a strong argument against an equal impact for all
groups. Nevertheless, the latter is frequently assumed in contemporary writing
that touches pluralist thought, also by Europeanists: e.g. Bomberg speaks of
“similar access and influence”  (1998, 183; see also Marsh, 1998, 189; and
implicitly Schmidt, 1997, 134). With regard to detailed empirical studies,
however, one may suspect that the assumption of equal influence for all lobbies
will discard almost every extant constellation (hence, the definition of the
pluralist form of policy network, i.e. the issue network, used in this paper does
not include such a characteristic).6
Differing definitions are not only problematic per se for scholarly discourse but
have furthermore made classifications of political systems partly inconsistent
with each other. This is even worse since there is  no single authoritative
classification of the EU member states with regard to their patterns of interest
politics and existing comparative studies do not always draw the same
conclusion. In any case, recent Europeanist papers regarded France, Italy and
Spain as statist polities while Austria, Germany and the Netherlands are usually
considered corporatist – notwithstanding partly differing definitions  (Schmidt,
1999; Streeck and Schmitter, 1994, 215; Lenschow, 1999, 16). No agreement
exists in the case of the UK: Green Cowles speaks of pluralist government–
business relations (1998, 4) while Schmidt takes the UK as a statist example
(1999, 1). Interestingly, pluralist systems in Europe are hardly explicitly named
but rather exist as a residual category while the US is chosen as the textbook
example of pluralism even if a comparison of political systems with the EU is at
stake (e.g. Schmidt, 1997, 135).
2. Differing Models and Expectations Concerning the EU
Another interesting feature of the (in quantitative terms meagre) literature on
Euro-politics and intermediation is that scholars use to deduce effects on the
national systems from one assumed cross-sectoral ideal-type of EU governance
style (on empirical meso-level differences see below) but their models as well as
                                              
5 The “vectors of influence” (Lehmbruch, 1979, 51) were perceived to run only in one direction,
i.e. from private lobbies to state agencies. There was no co-operation in the narrow sense
assumed, i.e. no multi-directional relations. However, it is most difficult to draw the borderline
between “negative co-ordination” (i.e. an implicit mutual adaptation of the competing actors which
is included in the pluralist pattern) on the one hand, and the active mobilisation of consensus (i.e.
direct negotiations which are a typical feature of corporatism), on the other (Czada, 1994, 53; van
Waarden, 1992, 34).
6 Equal or unequal influence are here considered a matter of empirics, not of definition.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 8
expected effects differ. In other words: The few available articles7 reaching
beyond individual case studies usually concentrate, in a first step, on describing
the EU as one particular type of state–society relations and, in a second step,
deduce from this general model of Euro-politics likely effects on the Member
States. The most famous of such accounts – with the telling title “from national
corporatism to transnational pluralism” – analyses why the EC falls short of
centralised labour-industry-state relations that would, such as in some historical
national systems, govern economic policy decisions in the wider sense in a
policy-transgressing manner. The authors consider most likely for the European
Union “an American-style pattern of  disjointed pluralism or  competitive
federalism, organised over no less than three levels – regions, nation-states, and
Brussels” (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991, 215).
Not all scholars, however, agree on these specific characteristics attributed
to “EC governance”.8 While Streeck and Schmitter described a pluralist style
similar to American patterns, Vivien Schmidt detects important differences to
the US model since she perceives the EC to be “less pluralistic in interest group
access, given that business is the interest mainly represented in a majority of
policy areas, and it contains  statist elements in its control of the process of
interest representation and its greater insulation from undue influence” (Schmidt,
1997, 134). She even talks about “statist pluralism” in policy formulation (1997,
138). Like Streeck and Schmitter, Schmidt also deduces impacts on national
interest politics from her general ideal-type of EU level governance  (1999;
1997). Her conclusion is that “statist polities have had a harder time adjusting to
EU level policy formulation, a more difficult task in implementing the policy
changes engendered by the EU, and a greater challenge in adapting their national
                                              
7 The impact of European integration on interest intermediation in the Member States has so far
hardly been discussed in detail and broad-based comparative empirical studies on the practical
effects in the Member States are missing. There are at least a few recent exceptions offering
interesting insights on the sectoral and case study level. Maria Green Cowles looks at the
“Transatlantic Business Dialogue” and its impact on national government–business relations in
France, Germany and the UK (1998). Andrea Lenschow discusses the implementation of EC
environmental policy acts and their impact on state–society relations in Germany, the Netherlands,
Spain and the UK (1999). A study of the implementation of four EC-environmental Directives in
Britain and Germany also allows some insights on private–public relations in  Knill/Lenschow
(1998).
8 I choose the term EC (and not EU) in this section primarily because this diminishes chances that
readers include the national level (since EU governance is often used to describe the entire multi-
level system, not only the EU as a specific supra-national political system). Since the debate on
patterns of governance focuses on EC policy fields and usually neglects the second and third EU
pillars with their very special style, using EC here is even correct in legal terms. The typology
presented below can nevertheless be applied to the second and third pillars as well.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 9
governance patterns to the new realities” while “the EU’s quasi-pluralist process
is in most ways more charitable to systems  characterized by  corporatist
processes  [...] because the “fit” is greater in such areas as societal actors’
interest organisation and access and governing bodies’ decision-making culture
and adaptability” (1999, 2). Schmidt argues that European integration enhances
the autonomy of political leaders in pluralist or even corporatist states, but not in
statist France where it has “diminished the overall autonomy of the executive at
the formulation stage, while it has undermined its flexibility at the
implementation stage” (1996, 249).
Beate  Kohler-Koch’s ideal-typical EC-style, “network governance”,
finally refers to a quite different animal that is characterised by co-operation
among all interested actors (instead of competition) and by joint learning
processes (1996). According to her, hierarchy and subordination give way to an
interchange on a more equal footing aimed at joint problem-solving  (Kohler-
Koch, 1999, 32) that will dissipate in the multi-level system. This suggests a
much more co-operative process than self-interested lobbying of many
individual private groups according to the pluralist ideal-type. There are thus
differing accounts of the basic characteristics of EC-public–private relations and,
based on them, diverse expectations with a view to effects of European
integration on national interest intermediation.
My suspicion is that the existing accounts are not necessarily
contradictory. I suggest reading them less as alternative accounts than as useful
pieces in a larger jigsaw. Breaking down the level of analysis to include the meso
level (for both the EC/EU and its Member States) might allow one to integrate
these analyses as each referring to different co-existing ideal-types of
governance at the EU level and/or to specific forms of impact on the national
systems.9 Existing confusion resulted mainly from the absence of, first, a
systematic connection of research on interest intermediation pointing at great
meso-level differences both in the Member States and in Euro-politics (see
below) and, second, an analytical distinction of various kinds of potential effects
of EC-level patterns in the Member States. The remainder of this article will try
to fill this gap. This should lead not to a general reversal of previous
expectations but to an important differentiation.
                                              
9 In terms of our discussion of the impact of Europeanisation on national interest politics, it is
important to note that much of the literature does not systematically distinguish changes in the
national policy process due to a trickling down of impacts from the EU level, on the one hand, and
the participation of national actors in the European decision process, on the other.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 10
III. A New Approach for Studying the Impact of European Integration on
National Interest Intermediation
1. Varying networks rather than “...isms” throughout the multi-level system
The approach to be presented here acknowledges differentiated governance sub-
systems at both the national and the EU level. Instead of “pluralism”,
“corporatism” or “statism”, it is therefore useful to speak about specific policy
networks with particular characteristics. The following sub-sections sum up
existing insights on the importance of the meso-level in interest politics at the
national (a) and European levels (b). Sub-section (c) then presents a scheme of
ideal types for both national and European politics. On that basis, the effects of
European integration on particular policy networks at the national level can be
established much more precisely than hitherto.
a) The national level
It was in fact clear from the beginning of the corporatism debate in the 1970s
that in some policy areas, notably in social policy, corporatist patterns were
much more frequent than in others.10 A multitude of case studies on patterns of
interest intermediation in EU member states quickly uncovered that even in non-
corporatist political systems, corporatist “arenas” did indeed emerge at the level
of industrial sectors, of sub-national political units and/or of single policy arenas
(see e.g. the contributions in Berger, 1981;  Cawson, 1985b; Grant, 1985b;
Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). Meanwhile, changes at the economic and the
political level made it even more improbable that within otherwise increasingly
fragmented political systems, corporatism should still cover all crucial issues of
policy-making such as Lehmbruch's ideal-type assumed (1985, 94).
Empirically, a strong trend towards sectoralisation of interest-politics was
recently acknowledged even for the corporatist “role model” Austria. In fact,
“social partnership” is much less uniformly characterised by interest group co-
decision in public policy-making than often assumed. In areas such as judicial
policy, education, research policy, consumer protection, defence policy and
telecommunications, the influence of the Austrian social partners is at best
marginal (Kittel and Tálos, 1999, 118; see also Müller, 1985, 220; Tálos, 1993,
27;  Tálos et al., 1993;  Traxler, 1996, 19).  Corporatist patterns are only
                                              
10 “In point of fact, all the interest intermediation systems of Western Europe are mixed. They
may be predominantly of one type, but different sectors and subsectors, classes and class factions,
regions and subregions are likely to be operating simultaneously according to different principles
and procedures” (Schmitter, 1979, 70; see also Lehmbruch, 1982, 27).RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 11
prominent in a few core areas (i.e. in social, economic and agricultural policies)
and even there not in all relevant issue areas and notably not in all specific
decision processes.
The Austrian case is by no means extraordinary since sectoralisation of
politics and a shift of industrial relations towards the sectoral level seem to
represent a rather broad trend (Karlhofer and Sickinger, 1999, 242). Compared
to the “classic” 1970s corporatism (which indeed was often macro-corporatism
with demand-side steering of the economy) contemporary  corporatist
arrangements now seem significantly restricted in functional scope as the policy-
making process is broken down and varies across policy subsystems  (e.g.
Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, 157).11 Nevertheless, meso-level diversity has so
far hardly been reflected in comparisons of the political systems of the EU
member states. Political scientists still tend to label whole countries as pluralist,
corporatist or statist without referring to the important  intra-state differences
identified in the state-specific literature although in single-country studies, a
refined heuristic approach is now frequently chosen on the basis of the policy
networks typology developed by British scholars.
The policy networks approach was developed explicitly to capture the
sectoral constellations emerging as a response to the growing dispersion among
public and private actors of resources and capacities for political action (Kenis
and Schneider, 1991, 28). With the scope of state intervention targets,
decentralisation and fragmentation of the state also increased over time and was
complemented by increased intervention and participation in decision-making by
ever more social and political actors. Policy networks were thus characterised as
“integrated hybrid structures of political governance” with the distinctive
capacity for mixing different combinations of bureaucracy, market, community,
or corporatist association as integrative logics (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, 42;
Mayntz, 1993, 44f).
While continental authors were more concerned with the characteristics of
“network governance” in general (see e.g. Marin and Mayntz, 1991b; Scharpf,
1993; Kooiman, 1993),12 British political scientists tended to concentrate on the
                                              
11 The fact that the sectoral economies, in turn, are increasingly internationalised represents one of
several challenges to cross-sectoral corporatist regimes (Hollingsworth and Streeck, 1994, 289).
12  A common conceptual approach to “policy networks” was however not developed: “By
definition of what makes a theoretical fashion, this term is attributed great analytical promise by its
proponents, whereas critical commentators argue that its meaning is still vague and that the
perspective it implies has not yet matured into anything like a coherent (middle range) theory. What
they agree on is their subject of concern, discourse and dispute, and that is sufficient to establishRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 12
development of policy network ideal-types. On the basis of earlier work by
authors such as Jordan and Richardson  (1983), David Marsh and R.A.W.
Rhodes elaborated the dominant typology (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes
and Marsh, 1992) that distinguishes closed and stable policy communities from
loose and open issue networks as the two polar ends of a multi-dimensional
continuum (the term “policy network” is thus a generic one encompassing all
types). The characteristics of both groups focus on the  dimensions
membership,13 integration,14 resources15 and power.16 Marsh and Rhodes stress
that the characteristics form an ideal-type to be compared with actual
relationships between governments and interests because no policy area would
conform exactly to either list of characteristics (1992, 187). These ideal-types
cannot explain politics within networks17 but they may be heuristically useful,
                                                                                                                                                 
policy networks on the theoretical agenda of contemporary social science, without necessarily
guaranteeing the declared value. On the contrary, a speculative oversupply of networking
terminology may inflate its explanatory power so that some form of intellectual control over the
conceptual currency in circulation, both its precise designations and its amount of diffusion, become
inevitably a clearance process within the profession” (Marin and Mayntz, 1991a, 11).
13 A policy community has a very limited number of participants and some groups are consciously
excluded while issue networks comprise large numbers of participants; concerning the type of
interest, in a policy community “economic and/or professional interest dominate”, while an issue
network encompasses a “range of affected interests”.
14 There are three sub-dimensions:  frequency of interaction (in policy communities, there is
“frequent, high-quality, interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issue”, whereas in
issue networks contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity)  continuity (changes from
“membership, values and outcomes persistent over time” to “access fluctuates significantly”) and
the consensus variable that reaches from “all participants share basic values and accept the
legitimacy of the outcome” to “a measure of agreement exists but conflict is ever present”.
15  Two sub-dimensions, i.e. distribution within network and distribution within participating
organisations: a policy community is characterised by all participants having resources and the
basic relationship being an exchange relationship in which leaders can deliver members; in an issue
network, by contrast, some participants may have resources, but they are limited and the basic
relationship is consultative, plus there is varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate
members.
16  Rhodes' and Marsh's policy community is characterised by the somewhat contradictory
statement “There is a balance of power between the members. Although one group may dominate,
it must be a positive sum game if community is to persist”. By contrast, an issue network
comprises “unequal powers, reflects unequal resources and unequal access. It is a zero-sum
game” Rhodes and Marsh 1992, 187).
17 Ideal-types never “explain” anything. One may certainly add on to the original Marsh/Rhodes
approach hypotheses from theoretical concepts in political science (e.g. structuralism) and thus
change it, see suggestions in (Marsh, 1998). When adding different potential explanatory variables,
however, there is a danger one will end up with only an over-complex inventory for empirical
research.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 13
notably also for comparisons of national and EU-level networks with a view to
determining the potential impact of the latter on the former (see below).18
b) The EU level
That the emergence of a supranational form of macro-corporatism comparable
to national patterns in the 1970s is unlikely was underlined in a number of
studies on EC interest politics (Streeck and Schmitter, 1994, 227, first published
in 1991; Kohler-Koch, 1992, 103; Traxler and Schmitter, 1995, 213).19
Almost at the same time, scholars increasingly pointed to fragmentation
as a typical feature of the  EU’s political system. Enormous cross-sectoral
differences are even laid down in the Treaties since the participation of the EP
and the ECOSOC varies and so do voting procedures in the Council and its sub-
groups. Such constitutionally fixed differences are however merely the tip of the
iceberg since they were further refined in long-standing political practice and
different  DGs now have very particular styles of interaction with private
interests. This was acknowledged by a whole new generation of meso-level
studies that addressed the question of EC governance at the area- and sector-
specific level  (Greenwood et al., 1992;  Mazey and Richardson, 1993;  Pedler
and Van  Schendelen, 1994;  Eichener and  Voelzkow, 1994a; Greenwood,
1995b; Wallace and Young, 1997).
The diverse styles of public–private interaction thus discovered in various
EC policy networks included  statist, pluralist and  corporatist patterns  (most
recently see Kohler-Koch, 1999). To give just a few examples, private interest
governments (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) and quasi-corporatist regimes were
detected in the regulation of pharmaceuticals  (Greenwood and  Ronit, 1992;
1995c), consumer electronics (Cawson, 1992), steel production (Grunert, 1987),
health and safety at work (Eichener and Voelzkow, 1994b; 1994c) technical
standardisation  (Eichener, 1993) and social policy  (Falkner, 1998). These
findings indicate that there is a plurality of sector-specific constellations rather
than a pluralist macro-system of Euro-politics (see already Cawson, 1992).
                                              
18 Without doubt, there is also some impact of the national on the European level but this is beyond
the scope of this article.
19 The mainstream of scholarly writing on interest politics at the European level describes specific
groups and their development without asking explicitly about the pattern of interest politics being
corporatist or pluralist. The focus tends to be on the number of groups in a given field and the date
of their foundation as well as on specifics of group membership and reasons for joining Euro-
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This insight bears important consequences with regard to the effects of
European integration on national public–private interaction styles: If
Europeanisation does not necessarily imply that a policy is decided according to
pluralist patterns, the assumptions on feedback into the national systems must be
adapted, too. It seems that the impact of Euro-politics could be much more
diverse (in the sense of differentiated between policy areas) than hitherto
expected.
c) A simple typology connecting two strands of literature
Needed are thus models of public–private interaction in the making of public
policies that allow a differentiation between varying situations in distinct policy
areas or economic sectors, like the British policy networks typology. At the
same time however, the well-established differentiation between statist, pluralist
and corporatist patterns which is still frequently used by scholars occupied with
Euro-politics  (Streeck and  Schmitter, 1994; 1997; 1999) should not be
discarded. Therefore, I suggest a combination of the two strands of literature
and incorporate a corporatist ideal type (see already Falkner, 1998) as well as a
statist one in the well-known issue network/policy community dichotomy. Since
the elaborated catalogue of characteristics by Rhodes and Marsh is in fact quite
complex and may easily result in blurred empirical types, my typology is a
slimmer form of theirs. I suggest choosing only two decisive dimensions and
treating all other characteristics mentioned by Marsh and Rhodes as empirical
matters to be described in empirical case studies.20
The typology proposed here thus includes four basic ideal-types of policy
networks grouped along the continua “stability of public–private interaction” and
“role of interest groups” (see Table 2 below). A statist cluster is thus a form of
policy network where interests groups either do not exist at all21 or are not paid
any attention since there is no public–private interaction (and certainly not a
stable one). An issue network has interaction between state and societal actors
but the interests groups’ role is merely consultative as the public actors decide
quite independently (this form is close to the pluralist paradigm). The policy
community, by contrast, is characterised by rather stable interaction patterns
with private groups being incorporated into the process of  decision-shaping,
                                              
20 In practice, this necessarily happens anyway since authors are confronted with partly
antagonistic findings on different dimensions of the complex typology but nevertheless have to
choose one ideal-typical label for the specific policy network in the end. This is much easier and
more objectively possible with a more economic typology.
21 This would then be a network of exclusively public actors (e.g. a para-state agency, a
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although without actual veto power. Only in a corporatist policy community do
interest groups actually come to share state authority. In this very stable form of
network, a few privileged groups (co-)decide public policies with or under the
control of public actors. As regards functionally oriented writing on policy
networks and European integration (e.g. Kohler-Koch, 1996) it is important to
mention that  network governance would in the understanding proposed here
apply to policy communities as well as to corporatist policy communities. In
both constellations, the participating public and private actors co-operate in
trying to find a consensual approach whenever possible.22
Table 1: Four Simple Ideal-types for the Analysis of Meso-level Interest Intermediation


































This simple typology allows us to distinguish between four basic types of policy
networks  at all levels of the European  multi-layer system. The following
section (III.2.a) will outline in detail how such a differentiated approach matters
in the analysis of potential impact of specific European networks on the national
ones (see notably Table 2). When networks of the same kind operate at the
Member State and EU levels, no great effects are to be expected. By contrast,
an encounter of adverse types, e.g. if a statist cluster at EU level co-exists with a
                                              
22 This fits in very well with the style where “political goals are not just determined by (legislation,
regulations and public administration) alone, but by way of the multi-stratified informal decision-
making process between groups” (Kohler-Koch, 1996, 370), where “the state” is more an arena
than an actor and where the upgrading of common interests is as common as the pursuit of
particular interests. Accordingly, the EU is seen to perform process management instead of
steering from above while the borderlines between the private and the public become blurred. It is
perceived to bring together interested actors and promote social learning based on discourse and
political entrepreneurship (Kohler-Koch, 1996, 372 with further references; see also 1999, 32).RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 16
corporatist policy community in a Member State, or vice versa, heralds the
highest degree of potential23 destabilisation (see in more detail below).
III.2. Types of Potential Impact on National Interest Intermediation
This section will (a) further specify the variegated influence of EU decision-
patterns as already briefly outlined above. It will furthermore present two other
mechanisms by which European integration may effect national public–private
co-operation (b and c).
a) EU decision patterns
As argued in section II, papers on the influence of Europeanisation on national
interest  intermediation so far used to describe one specific form of interest
politics as the typical one for the EC and to deduce from that an impact on the
national systems which were again assumed to show one ideal-type each. By
doing so,  sectoral differences on both the EU and the national level were
overlooked. The mechanism by which the pattern of public–private co-operation
practised at the EU level would impact on the Member States, in turn, was
usually not paid much attention. At least implicitly it was assumed that the EC
style would trickle down into the national systems since national actors
(including groups) participate in Euro-politics in one way or the other and can
transfer new ideas on “good practice” or new tactics into their domestic
environment.
This kind of (potential) effect on national interest politics is thus top-down
and indirect. Acknowledging that EU-level public–private interaction is as
variegated as at the national level, such effects stemming from EC decision
patterns must be highly area-specific: an issue network at the EU level will tend
to trigger different reactions at the national level than e.g. a corporatist policy
community. Participation in an EC network of the former type might encourage
some interest groups to show a lobbyist behaviour also at the national level
(usually, it will be those groups who are the more powerful players under
market conditions), at the expense of interest aggregation with other actors. If at
the EU level a corporatist policy community exists, national social partnerships
in the same field should have comparatively less to fear.
                                              
23 Whether or not changes actually take place in practice depends on mediating factors such as
institutions and agency at the national level and should be studied empirically in much more detail
than hitherto.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 17





















































































This table suggests that if we consider that various “cultures” of EU-level
decision-making can trickle down, we must expect the recent  corporatist
patterns of EC social policy to provoke effects quite different from those of a
statist or rather pluralist field of EU activity (if any changes at all take place).24
To start with the left column, a  statist cluster  (such as e.g. in European
monetary policy, see  Dyson in  Kohler-Koch and  Eising, 1999; tourism, see
Greenwood, 1995d, 139) will tend to confirm or even reinforce another statist
cluster at the national level (e.g., in Germany and Austria, where independent
central banks have existed for a long time already, the role of private interests in
this field will not be hampered by a similar style at the European level). If a
statist cluster meets an issue network, a policy community or a corporatist policy
community in a Member State, the potential effect will be to the detriment of
the role of private interests. A pluralist25 EC issue network, in turn (such as e.g.
                                              
24 As already mentioned above, the definitions for various public–private constellations in EU
policy-making differ. The following examples are hence necessarily taken from case studies with
differing conceptual backgrounds and even thematic focuses. I nevertheless thought that the
presented evidence allowed characterisation of the cases with one of my policy network ideal-
types – even though the author of the particular study may not necessarily have referred to a
network ideal-type or even a label such as pluralist, statist or corporatist patterns.
25 In the sense of the definition used here, i.e. not assuming equal influence for all groups.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 18
described by Bomberg, 1998 for environmental policy; for biotechnology see
Greenwood, 1995a; for water supply see Maloney, 1995, 155) will rather
promote more openness for interest groups in a national  statist cluster and
reinforce another issue network. If a Member State features a policy community
in the field, a possible impact will be in the direction of rather less participation
for private interests. National corporatist communities, too, will rather be pushed
towards less public–private co-decision. Further pursuing this logic, an EC
policy community (like there seems to be in the automobile sector, McLaughlin,
1995, 175) will tend to influence statist constellations as well as issue networks
in the direction of more participation of societal actors. Only the groups in
national  corporatist policy communities will probably feel an impact to the
detriment of their co-decisive role. Finally, a  corporatist policy community
(such as in EC social policy, Falkner, 1998) will rather increase the chances for
participation and co-decision in national  statist clusters, issue networks and
policy communities.
Although much more research is needed and other factors (see below)
matter too, it is still encouraging to note that empirical research on Austrian EU-
adaptation supports this approach. A study recently revealed that  corporatist
patterns in the core area of Austrian social partnership, i.e. social policy and
particularly labour law (Kittel and Tálos, 1999), were not significantly impinged
upon after EU membership (Karlhofer and Tálos, 1996; Tálos, 1999; Falkner et
al., 1999; 1999b). This fits the above hypothesis neatly since in the aftermath of
the Maastricht Treaty, a corporatist policy community was established in the
realm of EU social policy, too.26 By contrast, environmental policy in Austria is
not regulated in a “social partnership” pattern but managed in a policy
community without such a crucial role for labour and industry (Falkner et al.,
1999). At the EU level, an issue network exists in the environmental field, as
described in detail by Bomberg (1998). As far as a shift in the Austrian network
can be discerned so far,27 it is in the direction of more influence for the involved
Ministries but rather less for the interest groups (notably for the
environmentalists). These social and environmental policy cases in Austria
appear as examples numbered 1 and 2 in the Table 2 above.
                                              
26 As in Austria, labour law issues are predominant also in EC-level tripartite social policy-making
under the Maastricht Social Agreement (incorporated in the EC-Treaty at Amsterdam) that
includes labour (ETUC), employers (UNICE/CEEP) and “the state” (the Commission and the
Council) (for details see Falkner, 1998).
27 The basic type of network was changed neither in social nor in environmental policy since EU
adhesion.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 19
This suggests that breaking down the European policy-making patterns in
meso-level constellations results in what seem more realistic assumptions on
their effects in the also variegated national public–private networks. These
expectations should be tested in comparative empirical studies that are based on
research designs which explicitly include the meso level.28 The mechanism by
which Euro-patterns as outlined here could work as an impetus for change at the
national level is elite learning (see also table 3 below). Although this is a “soft”
form of influence, recent studies have underlined that supra-national policy
networks should not be underestimated since the EU involves national actors
and thus confronts them with a potentially new style. The latter may have
advantages which were not obvious to some before and may contribute to a
change in culture also at the national level (e.g. Kohler-Koch, 1999, 19). (On
various general conditions for the “viscosity” of national styles see below III.3).
While potential effects on the Member States stemming from EU decision
patterns were discussed by various authors already (and the purpose here was
only to refine the state of the art in a meso-level approach), almost no attention
has so far been paid to the fact that the EU may also influence national styles
somewhat more directly than this.
b) Positive integration measures
During the past decades, the EU Member States were confronted with an
increasingly high incidence of European legislation in meanwhile basically all
issue areas. It has aroused little scholarly attention so far that not only policies
may be transmitted in that way but also public-private interaction patterns.
Partly only as a side-effect of some policy goal, but at times clearly on purpose,
the EU quite frequently impinges on national interest intermediation in acts of
secondary law.
Some examples from social policy will reveal that in this field, there have
been manifold efforts to encourage corporatist patterns at the national level. In
some cases, derogations from common EC standards need to be negotiated or at
least discussed with the social partners in the Member State concerned. The
                                              
28 This is crucial in order not to simply confirm our limited advance knowledge on presumably
“national” styles. Clearly, the meso-level is not necessarily always the ideal level of analysis (and
this should by no means be claimed here). In fact, the most appropriate level of (dis)aggregation
(national/policy-specific/single decision) for a given research question has to be established in
empirical research and may differ from country to country. With a view to interest intermediation,
however, it seems that the meso-level is the comparatively most adequate: there is a rich literature
pointing at increased sectoralisation of formerly national systems, on the one hand, and it is, on the
other hand, practically impossible to  disaggregate further and study, say, all single decision-
processes in the field of environmental affairs for all (or even several) Member States.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 20
working time Directive thus allows for  derogations “by way of collective
agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at the
appropriate collective level” (OJ 93/L 307/18, Art. 17.3). The Directive on the
posting of workers in the framework of the free provision of services (OJ 97/L
18/1, Art. 3.3) states that “Member States may, after consulting employers and
labour, in accordance with the traditions and practices of each Member State,
decide” not to grant equal minimum pay to posted workers during the first
month of their stay abroad. This means that even a national government that has
no interest at all in cooperating with labour and industry on labour law matters,
must now consult these societal actors if it wants to derogate from specific EC
norms.
Contacts between public and private national actors in all Member States
are furthermore prompted by several recent EC social Directives prescribing that
in the national reports to the Commission on the practical implementation of the
respective Directive, the viewpoints “of the two sides of industry” must be
indicated (e.g. Art. 17.4 Directive on the protection of young people at work, OJ
94/L 216/12). This is also common practice in the field of health and safety at
work (e.g. rules concerning chemical agents at work).
In other cases, consultation or co-decision of interest groups is not directly
prescribed as a condition for certain national actions or needed to complete a
national report on implementation, but still encouraged and facilitated. For
example, the recent parental leave (OJ 98/L 14/9) and part-time work Directives
(OJ 96/L 145/4) allow for one additional year of implementation delay if the EC
provisions are implemented by a collective agreement instead of a law. The
recent part-time rules (that actually stem from a Euro-agreement between the
major interest groups of labour and employers that was incorporated in the
relevant Council Directive) also provide that “Member States, following
consultations with the social partners in accordance with national law or
practice, should [...] review obstacles [...] which may limit the opportunities for
part-time work and [...] eliminate them” (clause 5, emphasis added).29 The EC
standards furthermore do “not prejudice the right of the social partners to
conclude, at the appropriate level  [...] agreements adapting and/or
complementing the provisions of this Agreement in a manner which will take
account of the specific needs of the social partners concerned” (clause 6.3).
Finally, the provisions on implementation provide that “Member States and/or
social partners may maintain or introduce more favourable provisions [...]”
                                              
29 In the following sub-paragraph, the national social partners are directly addressed and asked to
review such obstacles “within their sphere of competence and through the procedures set out in
collective agreements”.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 21
(clause 6.1 of part-time Agreement; very similar passages are to be found in the
parental leave Directive and Agreement).
In environmental policy, too, a few recent Directives could impact on
national public–private interaction since they encourage more open structures
vis-à-vis private groups. “The plurality of actors associated with the different
instruments will result in new complexity in territorial and public–private terms,
counter-acting old hierarchical chains of command”  (Lenschow, 1999, 9).
However, such patterns are only in single Directives while others might impact
in the adverse direction, so that it is “doubtful whether EC governance in the
field of environmental policy is sufficiently comprehensive, coherent and stable
to trigger a decisive and uniform response” (ibid., 17). This points to the fact
that potential “positive integration effects” as outlined in this sub-section may
well be contradictory. Only if the aggregate impetus from the various EC
Directives in a specific policy area exceeds “zero” can such influence be
expected to produce adaptational pressure in a national policy network.
Research on the influences on public–private co-operation in the Member
States exerted by positive integration measures is another field where systematic
and comparative empirical studies are still missing.
c) Competence transfers
The third influence on the Member States” public–private relations stemming
from European integration results from shifts of manifold competences to the
EU level. It is a quite direct effect on the national systems that the latter can no
longer decide these matters. The overall realm of national action capacity
decreases parallel to each issue area that is covered by EU policy. This “size”
effect on the national interest  intermediation systems exists regardless of any
specific actor constellation in the Member State.
However, it is possible that not all public–private interaction patterns are
affected by this to the same extent. In particular, it seems reasonable to expect
that cross-sectoral  corporatist systems (macro-corporatism) would be impinged
on more adversely, since the number of issue areas available for corporatist
exchange between the state and national interest groups has decreased. This
suggests that the impact of competence transfers would nowadays impede the
old-style national macro-corporatism in EU Member States anyway, i.e. even if
sectoral differentiation had not already changed the national patterns. At the
macro level, Streeck and Schmitter were thus without any doubt right in pointing
out that “ corporatism as a national-level accord between  encompassingly
organized socio-economic classes and the state, by which an entire economy isRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 22
comprehensively governed, would seem to be a matter of the past”, not least
due to European integration (1994, 203). However, this correct diagnosis is only
part of the story about effects of  Europeanisation on national interest
intermediation – since at least at the meso level, the effects stemming from EC
decision patterns and positive integration measures may be countervailing
impulses.30
By the way: Even where “only” negative integration  (Scharpf, 1996)
prevails in Euro-policies (e.g. where positive integration measures are blocked in
the Council), there may be an effect on national interest politics since the neo-
liberal options chosen at the EU level may pose restraints. National networks in
the relevant area are in such cases restricted in their policy choices. De facto,
this affects the opportunity structure for national actors (see also Cowles and
Risse, forthcoming, 5), often at the expense of unions or consumer groups with
an interest in state interventions that are no longer legal under EC law. As
Streeck and Schmitter pointed out, mutual recognition in the Internal Market
and the resulting inter-regime competition tend to devaluate the power resources
and political strength of organised labour (1991, 203).
It follows from this sub-chapter that in fact, neither of the three different
types of (potential) impact on national interest  intermediation should be
neglected in thorough empirical studies.
III.3. The role of Mediating Factors
It has already been mentioned several times that this text is about influences that
European integration might exert on national interest intermediation. This is to
say that the Euro-level side of the coin is the primary topic, notwithstanding the
fact that the national processes of adaptation (or non-adaptation) are another
fascinating issue which is not necessarily less significant in terms of the final
result of the overall process (Lenschow, 1999; Risse et al., forthcoming; Knill
and Lenschow, 1998).
To demonstrate the potentially crucial role of national mediation of
impacts stemming from the EU-level, European Economic and Monetary Union
                                              
30 An additional general aspect should at least be mentioned here: From the Member State
perspective, influencing EU level decisions often seems much easier if a “concerted approach” of
all national actors is achieved. In many cases, “the politics of uncertainty (might therefore, GF)
lead national governments and national interest groups to try to co-ordinate their Euro-strategies. In
that sense, Euro-policy-making may bring them closer together” (Richardson 1996, 31).RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 23
is a good case in point. The effect of the Maastricht convergence criteria for
membership in the EMU on public–private relations in various Member States
couldn’t have been more divergent. It allowed several governments to reform
their national budgets by cutting public spending at a speed and in a form that
would otherwise not have been accepted by either employer or labour
associations, most notably in Austria (Unger, 1999; Tálos and Falkner, 1996).
Euro-policies may thus increase chances for governments to “cut slack” and
gain leverage vis-à-vis their major private players. At the same time, however,
this EC policy triggered reinforced public-private cooperation in other Member
States where issue-specific31 and fixed-term tripartite pacts were concluded with
a view to reaching the convergence criteria (usually labelled “social pacts”, e.g.
Fajertag and Pochet, 1997; Hassel, 1998). Although EMU surely constitutes a
special case, and other EU influences will be comparatively more direct in their
effect, this indicates that mitigation in the national networks of EU impetuses
indeed plays a major role in the field of interest intermediation.
With regard to empirical studies, it seems that the role of various factors
such as institutions and agency at the national level should be studied in much
more detail than hitherto, not least taking into consideration different policy
networks in the same Member State. Here, only a few plausible hypotheses can
be put forward regarding the potential transmission mechanisms and the forms
of policy networks as outlined above:
1)  The more direct the type of potential impact, the more probable an
effect on the national level seems. This means that a transfer of
competences will often matter regardless of national action/reaction
thereto. A positive integration measure that e.g. allows a Member State a
derogation from EC law only under the condition of approval by labour
and industry, will involve national action but is more likely to show some
effects than just EU decision patterns that are different from the national
ones would. The latter were much discussed in the existing literature
although they are, in fact, the least direct of the mechanisms described
here, since they are only transmitted via accommodation and learning
processes.
                                              
31 This is another indicator that corporatist patterns nowadays tend to be located at a lower
structural level and to fulfil more narrow functions than formerly. Notably, they often facilitate
labour law and pay adaptations to EMU  (Falkner, 1999a) rather than being a macro-level
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2)  Common  institutionalist assumptions suggest that the more
engrained the specific national policy network, the lesser and slower the
probable impact of European integration on it is likely to be.
3)  Concurring  competences within the same policy field should
promote learning and adaptation processes. The impact of EU decision
patterns (if diverging from the relevant national ones) should in such cases
matter comparatively more. In general, the higher the EU share of activity
in a policy field, the more influential the EU patterns of policy-making
should be.
4)  The more demanding the conditions of a specific form of public–
private cooperation pattern, the greater the danger of its being called into
question by challenges from outside. The fact that  corporatist patterns
seem more difficult to establish than pluralist competition of societal
actors suggests that they might be rather more vulnerable in the multi-level
system.32
IV.  Conclusions: Converging towards “more uniform pluriformism”?
This paper advocates  including the  meso level of policy networks in the
analysis of interest  intermediation, not only at both the European and the
national levels but particularly with a view to determining possible influences of
the former on the latter (see table 1). Only such a differentiated approach will
result in realistic assumptions concerning the impact on national policy networks
of EC patterns of public-private interaction (and some preliminary results of
empirical research presented above confirm this; see table 2 ). Clearly, much
more research is needed on both the EU’s and the national policy networks, in
particular systematically comparative work.
The second main argument of this paper is that there is more than one
type of EU impact on national interest intermediation. Most frequently discussed
so far were EC decision patterns that might trickle down. By contrast, the more
direct impact of interest intermediation patterns imposed on the Member States
in EC Directives was hardly paid attention to as a relevant influence. Finally, the
effects of the transfer of various competences to the EU level must also be
                                              
32 Note that this is notwithstanding the possibility that at the same time, European integration or the
EU as an institution might promote corporatist patterns in particular areas, by other means.RSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 25
taken into account. The three mechanisms all have to be considered when it
comes to assessing the effect of  Europeanisation on national interest
intermediation. At times, they may counteract each other.
A third important aspect, although not tackled in detail in this paper, is
that European integration influences the national public–private interaction
patterns mostly in an indirect manner. This points to the crucial role of
mediating factors at the national or sectoral level. Nevertheless, one can deduce
some general expectations from the innovative approach chosen in this paper, in
the form of preliminary hypotheses on future trends in European interest
intermediation.
First, our meso-level approach suggests that  inter-sectoral diversity in
private–public interaction during the policy process  will persist or even
increase. As outlined above, both the national and the European layers of the
multi-level system are in fact characterised by highly divergent styles of interest
intermediation at the meso level. Since the EC is a very strongly sectoralised
system, even formerly rather unitary states in terms of public–private interaction
could be expected to increase inter-sectoral differences. Since policy networks
were recently described as relevant meso-level constellations in the European
states anyway, the EU will only reinforce an already existing trend towards
sectoral differentiation in national states.
Secondly, and at the same time, the inter-systemic diversity (i.e. both
between different EU Member States, and between the EU and its Member
States) of policy networks will in the future be a rather more moderate one:
Since the EC patterns will influence all national systems in the same direction,
the effect over time should be some convergence towards the EC model since
the latter is the point of reference for all national networks. In the words of
Adrienne Héritier et al. (1994), one may think of path-dependent corridors of
adaptation that are open to each of the national policy networks. Since all
national networks are, however, influenced by the same Euro-level pattern
existing in the relevant field (which may be perceived as the end-point of the
corridor in a distant future), the result should nevertheless be “adaptation
towards similarity”. Some divergence will persist, but probably in a more
moderated form than before the EU gained any influence at all on national
policy networks.
In other words, there is a trend towards cross-sectorally divergent styles
of public–private interaction that will nevertheless bring about rather more
convergence than before between the geographic layers of the European UnionRSC 99/34  © Gerda Falkner 26
and between the different Member States. We could thus be heading “towards
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